Abstract-Security is an important issue in wireless sensor networks (WSNs), which are often deployed in hostile environments. The q-composite key predistribution scheme has been recognized as a suitable approach to secure WSNs. Although the q-composite scheme has received much attention in the literature, there is still a lack of rigorous analysis for secure WSNs operating under the q-composite scheme in consideration of the unreliability of links. One main difficulty lies in analyzing the network topology, whose links are not independent. Wireless links can be unreliable in practice due to the presence of physical barriers between sensors or because of harsh environmental conditions severely impairing communications. In this paper, we resolve the difficult challenge and investigate topological properties related to node degree in WSNs operating under the q-composite scheme with unreliable communication links modeled as independent ON/OFF channels. Specifically, we derive the asymptotically exact probability for the property of minimum degree being at least k, present the asymptotic probability distribution for the minimum degree, and demonstrate that the number of nodes with a fixed degree is in distribution asymptotically equivalent to a Poisson random variable. We further use the theoretical results to provide useful design guidelines for secure WSNs. Experimental results also confirm the validity of our analytical findings.
I. INTRODUCTION
W IRELESS sensor networks (WSNs) enable a broad range of applications including military surveillance, home automation, and patient monitoring [1] . In many scenarios, since WSNs are deployed in adversarial environments, security becomes an important issue. To this end, key predistribution has been recognized as a typical solution to secure WSNs [2] . The idea is to randomly assign cryptographic keys to sensors before network deployment.
Various key predistribution schemes have been studied in the literature [1] - [13] .
The q-composite key predistribution scheme proposed by Chan et al. [1] as an extension of the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme [2] (the q-composite scheme in the case of q = 1) has received much interest [10] - [17] since its introduction. The q-composite scheme when q ≥ 2 outperforms the EschenauerGligor scheme in terms of the strength against small-scale network capture attacks while trading off increased vulnerability in the face of large-scale attacks.
The q-composite scheme [1] works as follows. For a WSN with n sensors, prior to deployment, each sensor is independently assigned K n different keys which are selected uniformly at random from a pool of P n keys, where K n and P n are both functions of n, with K n ≤ P n . Then two sensors establish a link in between after deployment if and only if they share at least q keys and the physical link constraint between them is satisfied. Examples of physical link constraints include the reliability of the transmission channel [3] , [5] and the requirement that the distance between two sensors should be close enough for communication [16] .
Communication links between sensor nodes may not be available due to the presence of physical barriers between nodes or because of harsh environmental conditions severely impairing transmission. To represent unreliable links, we use the on/off channel model where each link is either on (i.e., active) with probability p n or off (i.e., inactive) with probability (1 − p n ), where p n is a function of n for generality.
In addition to link failure, sensor nodes are also prone to failure in WSNs deployed in hostile environments. To ensure reliability against the failure of sensors, we study the property of minimum degree being at least k so that each sensor is directly connected to at least k other sensors. This means that a sensor may still be connected to a sufficient number of sensors even if some neighbors fail. Note that the degree of a node v is the number of nodes having links with v; and the minimum (node) degree of a network is the least among the degrees of all nodes. Another related graph property is k-connectivity, which is stronger than the property of minimum degree being at least k. A network (or a graph) is said to be k-connected if it remains connected despite the deletion of any (k − 1) nodes [18] , [19] ; a network is simply deemed connected if it is 1-connected. Hence, k-connectivity provides a guarantee of network reliability against the failure of (k − 1) sensors due to adversarial attacks, battery depletion, harsh environmental conditions, etc.
In view of the above, we investigate topological properties related to node degree in WSNs employing the q-composite key predistribution scheme under the on/off channel model as the physical link constraint comprising independent channels which are either on or off. Specifically, we derive the asymptotically exact probabilities for the property of minimum degree being at least k, establish the asymptotic probability distribution for the minimum degree, and show that the number of nodes with a fixed degree is in distribution asymptotically equivalent to a Poisson random variable. Our results are useful for designing secure WSNs under link and node failure.
We summarize our contributions in the following two subsections. We first present our results on node degree for a secure WSN employing the q-composite key predistribution scheme under the on/off channel model. Then we use the results to provide useful design guidelines for secure WSNs.
A. Results
For G q denoting a secure sensor network with the q-composite key predistribution scheme under the on/off channel model, we present several results related to node degree, by considering the conditions on p e,q , which denotes the probability of a secure link between two sensors. The secure link probability p e,q is given by p e,q = p n · 1 − For the network G q , we now present the results, which are further elaborated in Section III-A.
• First, we derive the asymptotically exact probabilities for the property of minimum degree being at least k. Specifically, if p e,q = ln n+(k−1) ln ln n+αn n for a constant integer k ≥ 1 and a sequence α n satisfying lim n→∞ α n ∈ [−∞, ∞], then the probability that G q has a minimum degree at least k converges to e
• We extend the above result to provide the asymptotic probability distribution for the minimum degree. Specifically, when α n above can be written as α n = b ln ln n + β n for a constant integer b and a sequence β n satisfying −1 < lim inf n→∞ βn ln ln n ≤ lim sup n→∞ βn ln ln n < 1 (i.e., c 1 ln ln n ≤ β n ≤ c 2 ln ln n for constants −1 < c 1 ≤ c 2 < 1), we have the following:
, then the minimum degree of G q in the asymptotic sense
, and (iii) other values with probability 0; -if k + b ≤ 0, then the minimum degree of G q in the asymptotic sense equals 0 with probability 1.
• Our results on minimum degree are obtained by analyzing the number of nodes with a fixed degree. Specifically, we show that for a non-negative constant integer h, the number of nodes in G q with degree h is in distribution asymptotically equivalent to a Poisson random variable with mean n(h!) −1 (np e,q ) h e −npe,q .
B. Design Guidelines for Secure Sensor Networks
Based on the above results, for G q denoting a secure sensor network employing the q-composite key predistribution scheme under the on/off channel model, we obtain several guidelines below for choosing parameters to ensure that the network G q has certain minimum node degree. The guidelines are given by enforcing conditions on p e,q , the probability of a secure link between two sensors. Note that p e,q =
; see Equation (8) later.
For the network G q , we now present the design guidelines, which are further explained in Section III-B.
• First, to ensure that the network G q has a minimum degree no less than k (i.e., to ensure that each sensor is directly connected to at least k other sensors), we can choose network parameters to have
where the positive constant c 1 can be arbitrarily small.
• Second, to guarantee that the network G q has a minimum degree at least k with probability no less than ρ, we choose parameters to have
• Third, to ensure that the network G q has a minimum degree being k exactly, we can choose network parameters to have
where the positive constant c 2 can be arbitrarily small.
C. Roadmap
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section II describes the system model in detail. Afterwards, we elaborate and discuss the results in Section III. In Section IV, we prove Theorems 1 and 2 using Theorem 3. In Section V, we detail the steps of establishing Theorem 3 through Lemma 1. Section VI provides the proof of Lemma 1 by the help of Propositions 1 and 2, which are proved in Sections VII and VIII, respectively. Subsequently, we present experiments in Section IX to confirm our analytical results. Section X is devoted to relevant results in the literature. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section XI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL Our approach to the analysis is to explore the induced random graph models of the WSNs. As will be clear soon, the graph modeling a WSN under q-composite scheme and the on/off channel model is an intersection of two graphs belonging to different kinds, which renders the analysis challenging due to the intertwining of the two distinct types of random graphs [5] , [20] .
We elaborate the graph modeling of a WSN with n sensors, which employs the q-composite key predistribution scheme and works under the on/off channel model. We consider a node set V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } to represent the n sensors (a sensor is also referred to as a node). For each node v i ∈ V, the set of its K n different keys is denoted by S i , which is uniformly distributed among all K n -size subsets of a key pool of P n keys, and is referred to as the key ring of node v i .
The q-composite key predistribution scheme is modeled by a graph denoted by G q (n, K n , P n ), which is defined on the vertex set V such that any two different nodes v i and v j sharing at least q keys (such event is denoted by Γ ij ) have an edge in between. With
where |A| with A as a set means the cardinality of A.
As discussed, under the on/off channel model, each nodeto-node channel independently has probability p n of being on and probability (1 − p n ) of being off, where p n is a function of n. Denoting by C ij the event that the channel between distinct nodes v i and v j is on, we have P [C ij ] = p n , where P[E] denotes the probability that event E happens, throughout the paper. The on/off channel model is represented by an Erdős-Rényi graph G(n, p n ) [21] defined on the node set V such that v i and v j have an edge in between if event C ij happens.
Finally, we denote by G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) the underlying graph of the n-node WSN operating under the q-composite key predistribution scheme and the on/off channel model. We often write G q rather than G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) for notation brevity. Graph G q is defined on the node set V such that there exists an edge between nodes v i and v j if events Γ ij and C ij happen at the same time. We set event E ij := Γ ij ∩ C ij and also write E ij as E vivj when necessary. It is clear that G q can be seen as the intersection of G q (n, K n , P n ) and G(n, p n ), meaning
We define p s,q as the probability that two different nodes share at least q keys and p e,q as the probability that two distinct nodes have a link in between, where the subscripts "s" and "e" are short for "secure" and "edge", respectively. p s,q and p e,q both rely on K n , P n and q, while p e,q also depends on p n . Under P n ≥ 2K n , we determine p s,q through
where
since S i and S j are independently and uniformly selected from all K n -size subsets of a key pool with size P n . Then by the independence of events C ij and Γ ij , we obtain
Summarizing (5) (6) (7), we derive that under P n ≥ 2K n , the link probability p e,q is given by
III. THE RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We present and discuss the results in this section. Throughout the paper, q is a positive integer and does not scale with n; N 0 stands for the set of all positive integers; R is the set of all real numbers; e is the base of the natural logarithm function, ln; and the floor function x is the largest integer not greater than x. We consider e ∞ = ∞ and e −∞ = 0. The term "for all n sufficiently large" means "for any n ≥ N , where N ∈ N 0 is selected appropriately". As already mentioned, all asymptotic statements are understood with n → ∞, and we use the standard asymptotic notation
In particular, for two positive sequences f n and g n , f n ∼ g n signifies lim n→∞ fn gn = 1; namely, f n and g n are asymptotically equivalent.
A. The Results of Graph G q
We now present the results of graph G q below. Theorem 1 provides the probability of minimum degree being at least k in G q . 
then with δ denoting the minimum degree of G q , we have . Interpreting Theorem 1: Theorem 1 for graph G q presents the asymptotically exact probability and a zero-one law for the event that G q has a minimum degree no less than k, where a zero-one law means that the probability of a graph having a certain property asymptotically converges to 0 under some conditions and to 1 under some other conditions. To establish Theorem 1, we explain the basic ideas in Section III-C, and more technical details in Section IV.
While Theorem 1 above is for the property of minimum degree being at least some value, we now present Theorem 2 below, which gives a more fine-grained result to provide the asymptotic probability distribution for the minimum degree.
Theorem 2 (Minimum Degree in Graph G q : More FineGrained Results Compared With Theorem 1): Under the conditions of Theorem 1, if α n in Equation (9) can be written as
for a constant integer b and a sequence β n satisfying
then with δ denoting the minimum degree of G q , the properties ①-④ below follow:
The above results ③-⑤ for k + b ≥ 1 and lim n→∞ β n ∈ [−∞, ∞] can be compactly summarized as that the minimum degree of G q in the asymptotic sense equals (i)
, and (iii) other values with probability 0, while results ① says that if k + b ≤ 0, then the minimum degree of G q in the asymptotic sense equals 0 with probability 1.
Interpreting Theorem 2: Theorem 2 presents the asymptotic probability distribution for the minimum degree. We explain that Theorem 2 is more fine-grained than Theorem 1. We discuss first Theorem 2's result ① and then its results ②-⑤. (12) in (11), we have lim n→∞ α n = −∞, so we use (10c) of Theorem 1 to obtain δ < k almost surely (an event happens almost surely if its probability converges 1 as n → ∞), where δ denotes the minimum degree of G q . For comparison, (13a) of Theorem 2 presents the stronger result that δ = 0 almost surely. (ii) In the above results ②-⑤ where k + b ≥ 1 holds (i.e., b ≥ 1 − k) , we derive from (11) and (12) that
Below we discuss (17a)-(17e), respectively.
• For (17a) above, (10b) of Theorem 1 says δ ≥ k almost surely, while ② of Theorem 2 presents the stronger result that δ equals k (17e)). Summarizing the above, compared with Theorem 1, Theorem 2 presents a more fine-grained result for minimum degree in G q .
To prove Theorem 2, we provide the basic ideas in Section III-C, and more technical details in Section IV.
Theorems 1 and 2 above are for the property of minimum degree being at least k. We now consider a stronger graph/ network property, namely k-connectivity.
Extension to k-Connectivity: We can extend Theorem 1 to obtain the probability of k-connectivity in G q .
Specifically, we can replace
and K n = Ω(n ) for a positive constant . Due to space limitation, we present the proof in the full version [22] .
B. Design Guidelines for Secure Sensor Networks
Based on the above results, now we provide several design guidelines of secure sensor networks for achieving certain strength of minimum degree.
• First, to ensure that G q has a minimum degree no less than k, we can choose network parameters to set
where the positive constant c 1 can be arbitrarily small. To see this, since (18) implies that α n defined by (9) (i.e., p e,q = ln n+(k−1) ln ln n+αn n ) satisfies lim n→∞ α n = ∞, we use Theorem 1 to have P [G q has a minimum degree at least k.] = 1.
• Second, to guarantee that G q has a minimum degree at least k with probability no less than ρ, we choose parameters to ensure
To see this, since (19) implies that α n defined by (9) (i.e., p e,q =
• Third, to ensure that G q has a minimum degree being k exactly, we can choose network parameters to have
where the positive constant c 2 can be arbitrarily small. To see this, (20) implies that α n defined by (9) (i.e., p e,q = ln n+(k−1) ln ln n+αn n ) equals c 2 ln ln n, so b in (11) is 0 with β n satisfying (11) and lim n→∞ β n = ∞. Then we use Theorem 1-Result ④ to obtain P [Minimum degree of G q equals k exactly.] = 1.
C. Basic Ideas to Establish Theorems 1 and 2
We establish Theorems 1 and 2 for minimum degree in graph G q by analyzing the number of nodes with a fixed degree, for which we present Theorem 3 below. The details of using Theorem 3 to prove Theorems 1 and 2 are given in Section IV.
Theorem 3 (Possion Distribution for Number of Nodes With a Fixed Degree in Graph
and 
P
The number of nodes in G q with degree h equals . 
D. The Practicality of the Theorem Conditions
We check the practicality of the conditions in Theorem 1:
and
means that the key ring size K n on a sensor grows with the number n of sensors and thus it follows trivially in secure wireless sensor networks [10] , [23] , [24] . For k-connectivity, the condition on K n (i.e., K n = Ω(n ) is less appealing but is not much a problem because can be arbitrarily small. In addition, IV. PROOFS OF THEOREMS 1 AND 2 USING THEOREM 3
As explained in Section III-C, we establish Theorems 1 and 2 based on Theorem 3. Theorems 1 and 2 present results of δ, where δ denotes the minimum degree of G q . With Φ n,h denoting the number of nodes with degree h in G q , Theorem 3 provides the asymptotic distribution of Φ n,h . To use Theorem 3 for proving Theorems 1 and 2, we now discuss the relationship between δ and Φ n,h . For non-negative integer μ, it is straightforward to see properties ➊ and ➋ below. ➊ The event (δ ≥ μ) (i.e., the event that the minimum node degree of graph G q is at least μ) is equivalent to the event μ−1 h=0 (Φ n,h = 0) (i.e., no node has degree falling in {0, 1, . . . , μ − 1}). ➋ The event (δ ≤ μ) (i.e., the event that the minimum node degree of graph G q is at most μ) and the event μ h=0 (Φ n,h = 0) (i.e., there is at least one node with degree at most μ) are equivalent. Therefore, for any integer ξ, we obtain
where the indicator variable
To use (23)-(26), we will compute P[Φ n,h = 0] and P[Φ n,h = 0] for h = 0, 1, . . . To this end, we use Theorem 3, which shows that Φ n,h is in distribution asymptotically equivalent to a Poisson random variable with mean λ n,h specified by
i.e.,
To assess λ n,h in (27), we use (9) about p e,q (i.e., p e,q = ln n+(k−1) ln ln n+αn n ). While α n in Theorem 2 is given by (11) and satisfies |α n | = O(ln ln n) = o(ln n) for a constant integer b and a sequence β n under (12), α n in Theorem 1 may not satisfy |α n | = o(ln n). However, we can still introduce the additional condition |α n | = o(ln n) in proving Theorem 1, as explained in Appendix E of the full version [22] . The idea is to show that whenever Theorem 1 with |α n | = o(ln n) holds, then Theorem 1 regardless of |α n | = o(ln n). Now under |α n | = o(ln n) in Theorem 1, we obtain
where f n ∼ g n for two positive sequences f n and g n means lim n→∞ f n /g n = 1; i.e., (29) means lim n→∞ p e,q ln n n = 1.
Then we substitute (9) and (29) into (27) to derive
We now use Theorem 3 (i.e., (28) ) to prove Theorem 1 under the additional condition |α n | = o(ln n), which we can introduce based on the above discussion. Then we evaluate P[δ ≥ k]. Given k ≥ 1, we know from (25) and (28) that
and know from (26) and (28) that
Based on (31) and (32), we discuss the following cases.
•
Applying (33b) to (31) , and applying (33a) (33b) to (32),
Substituting (34) into (31), and substituting (34) into (32),
Using (35 ) in (31), we have 10c) is proved. We now use Theorem 3 (i.e., (28)) to prove Theorem 2. The condition (12) on β n implies that there are constants c 1 and c 2 with −1 < c 1 ≤ c 2 < 1 such that c 1 ln ln n ≤ β n ≤ c 2 ln ln n, for all n sufficiently large,
which implies
, for all n sufficiently large.
Using (11) 
Applying
Using (38) in (28), we get
If k+b ≤ 0, then (39c) gives P[Φ n,0 = 0] → 0, which along with (25) and (26) Below we consider the case of k + b ≥ 1 to prove properties ②-⑤ of Theorem 2.
Given k + b ≥ 1, we derive from (24) and (39a) that
Given k + b ≥ 1, we obtain from (23) and (39c) that
Given k + b ≥ 1, we show from (25) and (39b) that
and show from (26) and (39a) that
Then (42) and (43) together induce
From (40) and (41), we have
from (41) and (44), we obtain
and from (45) and (46), we conclude
Properties ②-⑤ of Theorem 3 follow from (45)-(47).
To summarize, We have used Theorem 3 (proved in Section V later) to establish Theorem 1 under the additional condition |α n | = o(ln n), and to establish Theorem 2.
In Appendix E of the full version [22] , we explain that whenever Theorem 1 with |α n | = o(ln n) holds, then Theorem 1 regardless of |α n | = o(ln n).
V. ESTABLISHING THEOREM 3

A. Method of Moments
For h = 0, 1, . . ., with Φ n,h counting the number of nodes with degree h in G q , we will show that Φ n,h asymptotically follows a Poisson distribution with mean λ n,h . This is done by using the method of moments; specifically, in view of [25, Th. 2.13], we will obtain the desired result upon establishing
Therefore, if Lemma 1 below holds, then the proof of property (a) in Theorem 3 is completed; in particular, we will have that for any integers h ≥ 0 and ≥ 0, 
Section VI details the proof of Lemma 1. Given (21), we obtain the following two results, which are frequently used in the rest of the paper:
and p e,q ≤ 2 ln n n for all n sufficiently large.
VI. THE PROOF OF LEMMA 1
To start with, we consider several notation that will be used throughout. We recall that C ij is the event that the communication channel between distinct nodes v i and v j is on. Then 
Recalling S i as the key set on node v i , we define a m-tuple T m through
Then we define L m as
With L m , we have the on/off states of all channels between nodes v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v m and the key sets S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m on these m nodes, so all edges between these nodes in graph G q are determined.
Let C m , T m and L m be the sets of all possible C m , T m and L m , respectively. We define
is the event that there is no edge between any two of nodes 
By (56), we further write P[E] as the sum of
Consequently, Lemma 1 holds after we prove the following Propositions 1 and 2. In the rest of the paper, we will often use 1 + x ≤ e x for any x ∈ R and 1 − xy
Proposition 1: Given (21) 
VII. THE PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We embark on the evaluation of (57) by computing
With C * 
where x 2 , . . . , x ) for integers ≥ 1 and
From (61) and
which holds by (54), we have
m , there exist i 1 and i 2 with 1 ≤ i 1 < i 2 ≤ m such that nodes v i1 and v i2 are neighbors with each other. Hence, 
along with (62) leading to
For any j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j m ∈ {0, 1} with
where E wvt is the event that there exists an edge between nodes w and v t in graph G q . Substituting (64-67) into (60), we obtain that if
Applying (59) and (68) to (57), we get
is at least 0 and at most h; and the remaining element |M 0 m | can be determined by (62). Then it's straightforward that
Using ( 
From (71) and lim n→∞ np e,q = ∞ by (51), the proof of Proposition 1 is completed once we show
A. Establishing (72)
From Lemma 3 of [22] , it holds that
where 
. (74) L.H.S. of (74) is denoted by H n,m and evaluated below. For each fixed and sufficiently large n, we consider: a)
, where δ is an arbitrary constant with 0 < δ < 1. a) p n < n −δ (ln n) 
which is substituted into H n,m to bring about
We relate H n,m to H n,m−1 and assess H n,m iteratively. 
npe,q pn Kn
By 
further leading to
Denoting
which together with
For 
By
For n sufficiently large, from p n ≥ n −δ (ln n) −1 and (52) (i.e., p e,q = p n p s,q ≤ 2 ln n n ), we have
From (80) and (81),
Given K n = ω(1), for arbitrary constant c > q and for all n sufficiently large, 
The use of (79) (82) and (83) in (76) yields
To derive H n,m iteratively based on (84), we compute H n,2 below. By definition, setting m = 2 in L.H.S. of (74) and considering the independence between events (S 1 = S * 1 ) and (S 2 = S * 2 ), we gain
Clearly, 
Therefore, it holds via (84) and (86) that
Finally, summarizing cases a) and b), we report 
are independent with each other. Therefore, with
applying the union bound, we obtain
In the following two subsections, we will prove
Substituting (89) and (91) into (87), and applying (90) and (92) to (88), we have
From (91), we get
Combining (93) and (94), and using
which holds from p e,q = p s,q p n and (52), Proposition 2 follows. Below we detail the proofs of (91) and (92).
A. Establishing (91)
We have
B. Establishing (92)
as given by (95) equals
Substituting (96) (102) above and Lemma 3 of [22] into (101), and using p e,q = o(1) and K n = ω(1), we conclude that
IX. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To confirm the theoretical results, we now provide experiments in the non-asymptotic regime; i.e., when parameter values are set according to real-world sensor network scenarios. As we will see, the experimental observations are in agreement with our theoretical findings.
In Figure 1 , we depict the probability that graph G q (n, K, P, p) has a minimum node degree at least k from both the simulation and the analysis, for k = 4, 8 and K varying from 29 to 36 (we set n = 2, 000, q = 2 and P = 10, 000 and p = 0.8). On the one hand, for the experimental curves in all figures, we generate 2, 000 independent samples of G q (n, K, P, p) given a parameter set and record the count (out of a possible 2, 000) that the minimum degree of graph G q (n, K, P, p) is no less than k. Then the empirical probabilities are obtained by dividing the counts by 2, 000. On the other hand, we approximate the analytical curves of Figure 1 by the asymptotic results as explained below. First, we compute the corresponding probability of p e,q in
given (8) and P > 2K. Then we determine α by (9) (we write Fig. 1 . A plot of the probability that graph Gq(n, K, P, p) has a minimum node degree at least k as a function of K for k = 4 and k = 8 with n = 2, 000, q = 2, P = 10, 000, and p = 0.8. Fig. 2 . A plot of the probability that graph Gq(n, K, P, p)'s minimum node degree equals k exactly as a function of K for k = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 with n = 3000, q = 2, P = 10000, and p = 0.5.
α n as α here as n is fixed); i.e., p e,q = ln n+(k−1) ln ln n+α n . Then given Remark 1 after Theorem 1, we plot the analytical curves by considering that the minimum degree of G q (n, K, P, p) is at least k with probability e − e −α (k−1)! . The observation that the simulation and the analytical curves in Figure 1 are close is in accordance with Theorem 1.
In Figures 2 and 3 , the curves with legends labelled "(E)" are experimental curves produced from experiments, while the curves with legends labelled "(A)" are analytical curves generated from theoretical analysis. In Figure 2 , we depict the probability that graph G q (n, K, P, p)'s minimum node degree equals k exactly as a function of K for k = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. We set n = 3000, q = 2, and P = 10000, and p = 0.5. For the experimental curves, we generate 2000 independent samples of graph G q (n, K, P, p) and record the count that the minimum degree of graph G q (n, K, P, p) is exactly k; and the empirical probability of G q (n, K, P, p) having a minimum degree of k is derived by averaging over the 2000 experiments. The analytical curves are produced as follows. First, we compute the corresponding probability of p e,q in G q (n, K, P, p) through the aforementioned expression p e,q = p · 1 − q−1 u=0
that p e,q − ln n+( −1) ln ln n n is minimized for integer (i.e., Fig. 3 . A plot of the probability distribution for the number of nodes with degree h for h = 0, 1, 2 in graph Gq(n, K, P, p) with n = 3000, q = 2, P = 10000, K = 35 and p = 0. . Given Remark 2 after Theorem 2, we plot the analytical curves by considering that i)
, and equals 0 for k = * and k = * − 1, and ii) if * ≤ 0, then P [δ = k] equals 1 for k = 0, and equals 0 for k = 0. The observation that the curves generated from the experimental and the analytical curves are close to each other confirms the result on the distribution of the minimum degree in Theorem 2.
In Figure 3 , we plot the probability distribution for the number of nodes with degree h in graph G q (n, K, P, p) for h = 0, 1, 2 from both the experiments and the analysis. We set n = 3000, q = 2, K = 35, P = 10000, and p = 0.5. On the one hand, for the experiments, we generate 2000 independent samples of G q (n, K, P, p) and record the count (out of a possible 2000) that the number of nodes with degree h for each h equals a particular non-negative number M . Then the empirical probabilities are obtained by dividing the counts by 2000. On the other hand, we approximate the analytical curves by the asymptotic results as explained below. In Theorem 3, we establish that the number of nodes in G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) with degree h approaches to a Poisson distribution with mean λ n,h = n(h!) −1 (np e,q ) h e −npe,q as n → ∞. We derive λ n,h by computing the corresponding probability of p e,q in G q (n, K, P, p) through p e,q = p · 1 − q−1 u=0
as explained above. Then for each h, we plot a Poisson distribution with mean λ n,h as the curve corresponding to the analysis. In Figure 3 , we observe that the curves generated from the experiments and those obtained by the analysis are close to each other, confirming the result on asymptotic Poisson distribution in Theorem 3.
X. RELATED WORK Erdős and Rényi [21] propose the random graph model G(n, p n ) defined on a node set with size n such that an edge between any two nodes exists with probability p n independently of all other edges. For graph G(n, p n ), Erdős and Rényi [21] derive the asymptotically exact probabilities for connectivity and the property that the minimum degree is at least 1, by proving first that the number of isolated nodes converges to a Poisson distribution as n → ∞. Later, they extend the results to general k in [26] , obtaining the asymptotic Poisson distribution for the number of nodes with any degree and the asymptotically exact probabilities for k-connectivity and the event that the minimum degree is at least k, where kconnectivity is defined as the property that the network remains connected in spite of the removal of any (k − 1) nodes.
Recall that graph G q (n, K n , P n ) models the topology of the q-composite key predistribution scheme [27] - [29] . For graph G q (n, K n , P n ), Bloznelis et al. [4] demonstrate that a connected component with at at least a constant fraction of n emerges asymptotically when probability p e,q exceeds 1/n. Recently, still for G q (n, K n , P n ), Bloznelis [14] establishes the asymptotic Poisson distribution for the number of nodes with any degree. Our results in Theorem 3 by setting p n as 1 imply his result; in particular, the result that he obtains is a special case of property (a) in our Theorem 3.
Yagan [5] presents zero-one laws in graph G 1 (our graph G q in the case of q = 1) for connectivity and for the property that the minimum degree is at least 1. Zhao et al. extend Yagan's results to general k for G 1 in [3] , [20] . Our results in this paper apply to general q, yet the corresponding results for q = 1 are already stronger than those in [3] , [5] , and [20] .
Krzywdziński and Rybarczyk [7] and Krishnan et al. [16] describe results for the probability of connectivity asymptotically converging to 1 in WSNs employing the q-composite key predistribution scheme with q = 1 (i.e., the EschenauerGligor key predistribution scheme), not under the on/off channel model but under the well-known disk model [7] , [16] , [30] , [31] , where nodes are distributed over a bounded region of a Euclidean plane, and two nodes have to be within a certain distance for communication. Simulation results in our work [3] indicate that for WSNs under the key predistribution scheme with q = 1, when the on-off channel model is replaced by the disk model, the performances for k-connectivity and for the property that the minimum degree is at least k do not change significantly.
XI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyze topological properties in secure wireless sensor networks (WSNs) operating under the qcomposite key predistribution scheme with unreliable links modeled as on/off channels. Our analytical results provide useful guidelines for designing secure WSNs. Experiments are shown to be in agreement with our theoretical findings. A future research direction is to consider communication models different from the on/off channel model.
